covers a lot of ground, but perhaps I may be allowed to make two supplementary observations.
Much has been said about the problematic ethical, moral and legal issues raised by this concept. Problematic, but not unsolvable. I like to think of the reciprocal scenario. Suppose that until now all human babies had come into existence as a result of cloning. Then, in March 1999, scientists announce an amazing discovery: there is a novel way of creating babies, the key step being a process which they name sexual intercourse. This announcement provokes a familiar outcry. First: 'Yuk!'. Then: 'Insuperable ethical, legal and moral difficulties! The child would suffer unimaginable confusion if it discovered that two people had contributed to its creation. And having to divide its loyalties between two parents would result in serious psychological problems. Think of the distress the child would experience if the two people responsible for its existence were to split up. And what would the legal position be if a couple produced a baby despite the fact that one of the partners had not explicitly consented to do so?' And: 'There would be unacceptable biological risks and uncertainties. People could no longer be certain of starting a baby exactly when they wanted to. The determination of the offspring's sex would be completely random. Moreover, the child would be at risk of suffering all kinds of abnormalities by possessing two copies of recessive defective genes.' And so on. In reality, society has been able to develop fairly adequate means for coping with these complex issues, so we need not feel too pessimistic about our ability to tackle new, but not totally unrelated, issues in the future.
In response to the Brave New World scenario in which an unscrupulous dictator embarks on a cloning programme as a means to a reprehensible end, there is the obvious point that any legislation to prohibit or restrict cloning (on whatever grounds) is likely to be powerless to prevent a dictatorial regime, ipsofacto, from doing whatever it wishes. Post-traumatic stress disorder Dr Field finds that almost every medicolegal report prepared by a psychiatrist or psychologist instructed on behalf of a plaintiff in personal injury litigation will conclude that he or she is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), irrespective of the severity of the accident . . . . How surprising, then, that almost every such report on behalf of a defendant concludes precisely the opposite. Perhaps his indignation should be directed against the present adversarial system of expert witnesses, and we should change to the Dutch system of an independent consultant. If we did, I suspect that plaintiffs would come off much better than the insurance companies.
However, Dr Field's paper not only contains many unscientific statements, but is not notable for its sympathy towards the usually innocent victims of accidents, some of whom have their lives irretrievably ruined. He regrets the 'wholesale adoption by British psychiatrists' of the diagnosis of PTSD as an 'importation from the United States'. In other words, that the condition was unknown here before the publication of DSM-III in 1980. This is simply not the case. Some years before that, I and other British psychiatrists were regularly identifying the disorder in accident victims, though it lacked a suitable name. Sometimes, courts would acknowledge its existence and award compensation, in spite of the fact that virtually the only published work on the subject was Miller's two 1961 papers on 'accident neurosis'1. These claimed to have shown that post-traumatic psychiatric symptoms always disappeared following the settlement of legal proceedings. How these data were obtained remains a mystery, since every reliable piece of research since then has obtained totally different results. However, the malign influence of Miller's opinion dominated the field for many years, denying many accident victims their well-deserved compensation.
Dr Field tries to wipe away the disorder by semantic sleight-of-hand, neglecting the fact that co-morbidity with other conditions is often present. But the real existence of this condition is a complex scientific It was refreshing to read Dr Field's forthright personal paper (January 1999JRSM, pp. 35-37). May I join my voice to his. PTSD is a neurotic, categorical psychiatric diagnosis and unusual amongst them in offering an aetiology for its genesis; strangely, however, in most cases exposure to traumatic events accounts for only some 35% of the variance of the condition. Of equal importance are individual pretraumatic factors such as previous history of psychiatric illness, abusive upbringing, personality difficulties and genetic predisposition. As in most non-psychotic disorders the genesis of PTSD is multifactorial and we must not forget that categorical diagnoses, being generally based on symptoms, are hypothetical, experimental and liable to change.
PTSD is one of the few psychiatric labels without stigma, a 'not my fault' diagnosis. It may well be 'not my fault', but attribution of blame to others can fix individuals in a victim role out of which even vast compensation cannot pull them. We live in a culture of blame, and there is plenty of money in this diagnosis. Another reason for the high prevalence is the ubiquity of the symptoms. It is possible to have all of the symptoms of PTSD following the break-up of a love affair, but very few people get PTSD in these situations. Indeed it is a constant finding that exposure to trauma of varying severity and duration does not consistently predict who will develop problems. Most individuals do not: now that is interesting (but financially unrewarding). In my view, such post-traumatic stress reactions (PTSRs) are very common, indeed a normal human experience, rather like grief in that only a few people go on to develop mental illness. I believe PTSD has come to describe normal reactions and to be seen as the only psychiatric reaction to trauma. However, those with a diagnosis of PTSD usually fulfil the criteria for two or three other psychiatric illnesses. There is a danger in applying the label PTSD if other psychiatric illnesses are overlooked. PTSRs are similar to grief in that they follow loss. Loss of control, of existential omnipotence, of faith in the constancy and non-random nature of life; loss of innocence in witnessing gruesome events; loss of faith itself; loss of body image and so forth. And, as with grief, a process has to be 'worked through' to assimilate the loss and to accommodate to new realities.
Change following trauma is inevitable, and unless it is accepted the process of healing cannot be started let alone completed-in much the same way that bereavement cannot start until death is accepted. Furthermore, help should be sought from family and friends before professionals. A healing and accommodating post-traumatic environment is helpful but not always available. If this environment is unsupportive or hostile, when coupled with the tendency to avoid talking about trauma, it can lead to the isolation of individuals and further difficulties. There is usually a time when individuals wish to talk about their experiences and we should respond to this normal human reaction with compassion and support, not by encouraging litigation or rushing in with hordes of counsellors.
If we wish to avoid stigrnatizing survivors, encouraging, dependency and ignoring the philosophical and spiritual aspects of traumatic events, let us not overuse PTSD to describe normal psychological reactions.
(The views expressed here are my own, and should not be taken to represent those of the Ministry of Defence.) I P Palmer Department of Psychiatry, Royal Defence Medical College, Fort Blockhouse, Gosport, Hants P012 2AB, UK
The causes of seasonal variation in births Kaye Wellings and her colleagues (February 1999 JRSM, pp. 60-64) provide a wealth of data to suggest that in England & Wales there is an increase in sexual activity around the Christmas period. During the first half of the 20th century, the seasonal pattern of births in European countries showed a major peak in the spring and a minor peak in the autumn. In contrast, the pattern in the USA for the past 150 years has been of a minor peak in the spring and a major peak in the autumn. More recently in England & Wales and several other European countries the pattern has come to resemble that in the USA. In an attempt to explain this curious change in the seasonal pattern of European births, I suggested that the level of autumn births reflects the difference between the proportion of couples who are together at the preceding Christmas (and in the USA at Thanksgiving) as contrasted
